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Indonesia’s “big bang” decentralization in 2001 
shifted much of the responsibility for local economic 
development from central government to district and 
city governments, which today number more than 450.  
But the performance of these districts has varied widely.  
This paper attempts to understand the determinants 
of sub-national (district/city) growth in Indonesia and 
map how these determinants have changed since before 
the 1997/98 economic crisis.  The authors exploit a 
rich dataset that includes a wide range of district-level 
characteristics, including education, population, cultural, 
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economic, and infrastructure variables, as well as a set of 
variables relating to distance, to try to explain growth.  
The analysis finds that, after accounting for differences in 
other variables, poorer districts tend to grow faster than 
better off districts.  Similarly, there is evidence of spatial 
divergence, in the sense that districts tend to grow faster 
if their neighbors are growing quickly.  However, the 
quality of the existing district-level data makes it difficult 
to identify whether endowments or factors related to 
distance are systematically associated with growth.ENDOWMENTS, LOCATION OR LUCK? 
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Indonesia is a very diverse and geographically dispersed country. An archipelago of more than 
17,000 islands, it stretches over 5,000 kilometers and across three time zones.  The geography of 
the country ranges from rainforest and agricultural plains to deserts and alpine mountains (World 
Bank, 2007). It is the home for more than 500 different ethnic groups who speak 742 different 
languages.
4  But alongside this diversity exists strong concentrations of population — 60 percent 
of Indonesia’s 245 million people (BPS, 2007) live on the island of Java, which covers only 6 
percent of Indonesia’s land area.  Socio-economic conditions vary greatly across the country.  
The per capita regional GDP of Riau and East Kalimantan, two oil and gas producing regions, is 
almost 20 times higher than that of Maluku or East Nusa Tenggara (NTT).  In some cities such as 
Denpasar, in Bali, and Bekasi, in West Java, poverty rates are below three percent, while in 
Manokwari and Puncak Jaya, both in Papua, they are in excess of 50 percent (World Bank, 2007). 
Indonesia underwent a “big bang” decentralization in 2001, and administrative, fiscal and 
political control over many policies has been devolved to (now) 33 provinces and over 450 
district/city level governments.  Thirty-six percent of government expenditure is now conducted 
by regional (provincial and district) governments, with very large increases in district government 
budgets in the past few years (World Bank, 2007).  Each province and district now has its own 
parliament (DPRD) with representatives elected by the general population, as well as the direct 
election of the district heads.
5  Provincial governments coordinate and perform strategic functions 
that affect more than one district government.  District level governments are responsible for 
most service delivery, local road building and much regulation of the local economy.     
Given its substantial decentralization of economic policy-making to the district level, the large 
number of regions, and the diversity of their endowments, Indonesia provides a particularly 
interesting opportunity to explore the determinants of sub-national growth.  The objective of this 
paper is to identify whether the differences in economic performance observed at the district level 
are due to the different endowments of districts (whether of natural resources, human capital or 
physical infrastructure); or whether they stem primarily from spatial factors (e.g. proximity to 
large cities, or distance from the capital).  A large recent literature has emphasized the importance 
of spatial factors in development,
6 but much of this literature looks at these factors in a cross-
country context, making it necessary to also account for differences in the institutional and legal 
structures of different countries.  By contrast, local governments in Indonesia share the same 
                                                      
4 Gordon, 2005. 
5 Governors for a province; bupati for rural districts called kabupaten; walikota for urban districts, or cities, called kota. 
6  See World Bank, forthcoming; Kim (2008) provides a review of the literature on spatial inequality; also see Hill 
(2008), which provides an overview of the economic geography of Indonesia, and Arze del Granado (2008), which 
describes the economics of concentration in Indonesia, both published in the World Development Report companion 
volume titled “Reshaping Economic Geography”.  
  2institutional and legal framework, providing the potential to differentiate more clearly between 
the impact of endowments and spatial factors on economic growth.
7  The vast diversity, 
geographic disparity and socio-economic differences across more than 450 autonomous districts 
and cities provide enough units of observation to test for the determinants of growth.   
Furthermore, Indonesia has economic data that cover several years before the East Asian crisis of 
1997/98, the crisis and immediate post-crisis period, as well as the first five years of 
decentralization, thus making it possible to explore whether the determinants of sub-national 
growth have changed over time.   
This paper uses districts rather than provinces as the unit of analysis.  Most previous studies on 
Indonesia have used provincial level data (Garcia and Soelistianingsih, 1998; Wibisono, 2003), 
although recently some other researchers have started using district level data (Landiyanto et al, 
2005; Fitrani, 2005).  This paper builds on the work done by Fitrani (2005), who looked at the 
growth performance of Indonesia’s districts from 1993 to 2003, finding conditional growth 
convergence after decentralization.  This paper extends Fitrani’s work in three ways.  First, it 
covers a longer time period (1993-2005) allowing a longer period of analysis of the 
decentralization period which started in 2001; second, it extends the range of growth determinants 
to include new data on economic geography; and, finally, it briefly explores the determinants of 
changes in sub-national growth, i.e. “growth accelerations and decelerations” and estimates the 
characteristics associated with districts that experienced such accelerations. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the large database of district level 
characteristics that has been constructed for this research.  Section 3 explores the spatial pattern 
of economic activity in Indonesia and how it has changed over time, whilst Section 4 undertakes 
a descriptive analysis of Indonesia’s sub-national pattern of growth from 1993 to 2005.  In 
Section 5 we discuss the estimation approach and provide empirical analysis of the determinants 
of growth at the sub-national level.  We also identify the pattern of growth accelerations (or 
decelerations) and attempt to explain these changes.  The conclusions and some policy 
implications are presented in Section 6. 
2. DATA 
Most of the data in this paper are generated from various surveys and censuses conducted by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).  The BPS conducts the National Socio-Economic Survey 
(Susenas) every year, which provides comprehensive socioeconomic indicators at the district 
level. Every three years, the BPS also conducts the Village Potential Census (Podes). This covers 
all villages in Indonesia, collecting data on basic infrastructure and socioeconomic conditions. 
We have also drawn budget data from the Regional Finance Information System (SIKD-Ministry 
of Finance), investment data from the Regional Investment Coordinating Boards (BKPMD), and 
                                                      
7 Districts do, however, vary politically and this may also influence growth. 
  3electoral data from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the General Election Commission (KPU) and 
The Asia Foundation (TAF).  
To calculate per capita growth we have used the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) and 
the population data from the BPS.
8  The BPS calculates GRDP data at the provincial and district 
levels, but there is a two-year lag in producing the latter. Thus the latest available district level 
GRDP data are from 2005.
9  The measure of growth used throughout is the geometric growth rate 
over the period.
10   
It is important to recognize that there are some significant weaknesses in the district level GRDP 
data produced by BPS.  GRDP calculations are conducted separately by the BPS offices at the 
national, provincial and district levels and, although all offices are supposed to follow a common 
methodology, this can result in variations in the quality with which the data are compiled.   
Moreover, BPS offices at the provincial and national levels do not ensure that the lower level 
figures add up to the provincial and national aggregates.  As a result, the sum of the published 
district GRDP varies from 91 percent to 105 percent of the published provincial GRDP depending 
on the province.
11  These weaknesses in the district level GRDP data do not necessarily create 
problems in the analysis of growth over time, although they are likely to add noise and make it 
harder to identify systematic influences on growth.  Nonetheless, to account for potential biases 
we also conducted our analysis using average consumption from the household survey data in the 
place of GRDP growth. 
One of the main challenges in constructing the database is in dealing with splitting districts. 
Enthusiasm for decentralization at the local level (coupled with strong fiscal incentives) has 
resulted in many districts splitting to form new, smaller districts. Over the years observed, the 
number of district governments in Indonesia grew by more than 50 percent. In 1999, the BPS 
recorded 299 districts in Indonesia. Within two years the number had increased rapidly such that 
the number of district governments receiving the General Allocation Fund (DAU) from the 
central government in 2001 was 336.
12 In 2005, Indonesia had 32 provinces and 434 districts that 
                                                      
8 There are in fact three different sources of population data: interpolations from the Population Census; Susenas data; 
and the population measures used by the Ministry of Finance to calculate fiscal transfers. In this analysis we use the 
first one because these are the official figures published by the BPS. 
9 The BPS calculates the real GRDP data using two base years. Data from 1993 to 2003 are based on 1993 prices, 
whilst data from 2000 to 2005 are based on 2000 prices.  Initially, we attempted to calculate a complete series for real 
GRDP in 2000 prices by inflating the figures for real GRDP prior to 2000 by the average ratio of real GRDP in 2000 
prices to GRDP in 1993 prices for the overlapping years (2000-03).  Unfortunately, inconsistencies in the re-basing 
process make this impossible.  Consequently, we use 1993 as the base year for analysis for the periods 1993-97, 1999-
2001, and 1993-2003, and the year 2000 as the base year for analysis of the period 2001-05. 
10 Sensitivity tests using the average annual growth rate and the logarithmic growth rate give qualitatively the same 
results. 
11 District GRDP sums to 98 percent of the provincial GRDP for the median province. 
12 The number of districts is not consistent across sources of data. For example, BPS’s Susenas and Podes surveys do 
not always have the same number of districts even when they are conducted in the same years. This is because of 
different sampling frame used at different times of the year. In addition the de jure and de facto status of a new district 
  4received DAU.
13 In order to avoid spurious changes in per capita growth rates resulting from the 
splitting of districts, we have used GRDP data as our reference point. GRDP data for the pre-
decentralization era are only for 292 districts. We therefore collapsed the post-decentralization 
data in order to provide data for exactly the same set of 292 districts throughout.
14 
We have also compiled a wide range of variables that can be used to explain district level 
economic growth.  Specifically our data include three types of variables: 
Factor endowments – We follow the neoclassical Solow growth model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1994) by interpreting capital in a broad sense including measures of population and human capital 
as well as the availability of physical capital or land. Following Barro (1991), we use education as 
a proxy for human capital under the assumption that for a given starting value of GRDP per 
capita, a country’s subsequent growth rate is positively related to this human capital. Good 
measures of physical capital are difficult to obtain at the district level.  However, we do have data 
on the share of households with telephone connections, which we use as an indication of the 
development of physical capital. 
Geography – Geographical location and topography may be as important for district growth as 
natural resource endowments. For example, Krugman (2007) emphasizes that transaction costs 
across distance play a crucial role in shaping a pattern of trade that can induce growth. We 
therefore include some proxies for remoteness and topography in the data. Specifically, we 
measure distance by calculating the straight line distance from the main town of the district to the 
provincial capital and to the largest five cities in the country.
15  We also incorporate dummy 
variables for whether these destinations are separated from the district town by sea.  
A district’s growth performance is also affected by the growth performance of its neighbors. We 
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where GAWi,t  is the weighted average growth performance of the districts that are neighbors to 
district i at time t.  We use GDP weights for importance i.e. w,q,t = GDPq,t /
  miΣq=1 GDPq,t.  Growth 
                                                                                                                                                              
is recorded differently by different institutions. To be consistent, we have used the definition of the Ministry of Finance 
— an autonomous province/district is the one that receives DAU in the beginning of fiscal year.  
13 Since 2001, the number of districts in Indonesia (excluding six non-autonomous district level governments in 
Jakarta) is: 2001 = 336, 2002 = 348, 2003 = 370, 2004 = 410, 2005-07 = 434, 2008 = 459. 
14 Our database has data for 292 districts. However, regression results do not always show this number of districts 
because data are missing for some observations. 
15 Ideally actual road distance would be a better measure of remoteness than straight line distance but unfortunately 
these data were not available. 
  5is calculated as gaq,t = ln(yq,t) – ln(yq,t-1) where yq,t stands for the real GRDP of neighbor district q 
in time t and mi is the number of neighboring districts of district i.  
Institutional and policy variables – Ideally, we would also like to be able to reflect the potential 
growth impact of district level politics and local policies by including data on local parliamentary 
elections, as well as the direct elections of local mayors and district heads.  Unfortunately, 
because these elections are relatively new, these data are only available for the most recent years 
and are therefore unlikely to be exogenous to the growth process themselves.  We do however 
include the Ethno-linguistic Fragmentation Index as a proxy for the extent of cultural and 
linguistic homogeneity, which has been shown to influence growth in the African context 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997). A complete list of data and descriptive statistics are available in 
Appendix 1. 
3. THE SPATIAL INEQUALITY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN INDONESIA 
As in most countries, economic activity is very concentrated in Indonesia.  Figure 1 shows a map 
of district GRDP.  The share of national GRDP is much higher for districts near the major cities 
of Jakarta, Medan and Surabaya and also much higher in the natural resource rich locations of 
East Kalimantan, Riau and Papua. 
Figure 1: District share of national GRDP in Indonesia, 2003 
 
 
This concentrated pattern of GRDP does not, however, translate into an equally concentrated 
patter of per capita GRDP (Figure 2).  This is because economic activities tend to locate in 
districts with higher populations and, conversely, because people tend to move to locations with 
better economic opportunities.  The main exception to this is in more remote natural resource 
abundant locations, particularly those involving capital intensive point-source resources, such as 
oil and gas.  In these locations, the GRDP per capita is often very large since this measure simply 
divides the substantial value-added of the resource extractive activity by a relatively small 
  6population.  Generally, GRDP per capita is a poor indicator of average welfare in such locations 
— indeed many of these locations have high levels of poverty.  The correlation between mean 
district per capita expenditure and district per capita GRDP jumps from 0.39 to 0.63 simply by 
excluding five oil-rich districts.   
Figure 2: District per capita GRDP in Indonesia, 2003 
 
It is also interesting to explore economic concentration at the provincial level. The left panel of 
Figure 3 shows the share of provincial GRDP made up by the top 20 percent of districts within 
it
16 against the per capita GRDP of the province.  There is a clear positive relationship, with 
richer provinces tending to have a more concentrated distribution of economic activity.  However, 
as with the national picture, this relationship disappears when considering the distribution of per 
capita GRDP.  The right panel of Figure 3 shows the Gini coefficient of district per capita GRDP 
for each province.  It is not generally the case that per capita GRDP is more unequally distributed 
in richer provinces.  This is because richer provinces also have substantially more concentrated 
populations than provinces with lower per capita GRDP. 
The pattern of spatial inequality of economic activity changed substantially between 1993 and 
2003.  Figure 4 shows the evolution of inequality between provinces and between districts over 
the period.  Inter-provincial inequality of per capita GRDP has been falling steadily throughout 
the period.
17  At the same time, prior to the crisis, inter-district inequality was increasing, but has 
fallen since.  This seemingly contradictory evolution of spatial inequality can be explained by the 
rise in inequality between districts within provinces prior to the crisis. 
                                                      
16 Ranked by share of provincial GRDP. 
17 This is the continuation of a longer trend. Garcia et al., 1998, show that, from 1975 to 1993, Indonesia experienced a 
significant decrease in the disparity of provincial GRDP. 
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The pattern of increasing inequality across districts varies by province and island group.  Table 1 
shows the Theil and Gini inequality measures for each of the major island groups in the country.  
The general pattern of an increase in inequality across districts at the national level is confirmed 
by the large increase in both inequality measures between 1993 and 1999.  However, the national 
increase is driven by increasing inequality across districts in Sumatra, Java and Bali, Sulawesi, 
and Papua, with inequality across districts in Kalimantan, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara falling 
during this period.   
Table 1: Inequality of GRDP per capita across districts by island group 
  Theil Index  Gini Coefficient 
  1993  1999  2001  2005  1993  1999  2001  2005 
Sumatra  0.14  0.20  0.13  0.15  0.26  0.31  0.27  0.27 
Kalimantan  0.28  0.27  0.28  0.38  0.38  0.37  0.39  0.42 
Java & Bali  0.26  0.33  0.38  0.35  0.35  0.38  0.40  0.39 
Sulawesi  0.04  0.07  0.06  0.09  0.16  0.20  0.19  0.23 
Maluku + Nusa Tenggara  0.10  0.07  0.20  0.17  0.23  0.20  0.32  0.29 
Papua  0.75  1.15  0.80  0.76  0.57  0.68  0.57  0.57 
                 
Total  0.31  0.43  0.35  0.35  0.37  0.41  0.39  0.39 
Eastern Indonesia  0.56  0.92  0.52  0.45  0.41  0.49  0.41  0.40 
Western Indonesia  0.24  0.29  0.30  0.31  0.34  0.37  0.38  0.38 
Java  0.28  0.35  0.41  0.38  0.36  0.38  0.41  0.40 
Off Java  0.33  0.47  0.32  0.33  0.38  0.42  0.38  0.38 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GRDP data from BPS. Gini coefficient of real GRDP per capita across districts. 
                                                      
18 Provincial GDP data based on 1993 prices are only available from 1993 to 2002, while kabupaten/kota GDP data based on 1993 
prices are available from 1993 to 2003.   
 
  9Although the disparities in GRDP per capita across districts have declined since 1999, they are 
still higher after the crisis than before, with a Gini coefficient of real GRDP per capita across 
districts of 0.39 since 2005, compared with 0.37 in 1993.  Table 1 shows that this is driven by a 
large decline in inequality between districts in Papua and, to a lesser extent, Sumatra, whilst 
inequality within the other major island groups has remained constant or increased. Although, 
almost every island group experiences a long-run increase in inequality across districts, the 
national increase is driven by widening disparities between districts in Java, with little change in 
the overall level of inequality across districts off Java.   
But the recent decline in inter-district inequality is mostly due to the continued decline in inter-
provincial inequality. This seemingly contradictory evolution of spatial inequality can be 
explained by decomposing inequality into two components: that due to the change in inequality 
between provinces; and that due to the change in inequality between districts within provinces.  
Interestingly, the decline in inter-district inequality since 1998 shown in Figure 4 does not result 
from improvements in the within-province distribution of per capita GRDP.  Table 2 decomposes 
the change in national inter-district inequality
19 into changes in between-provincial inequality and 
changes in within-province inequality.  Within-province inequality barely changes between 1998 
and 2003, with almost all of the change in inter-district inequality being driven by the continued 
decline in inequality between provinces. 
Table 2: Decomposition of changes in inter-district inequality 
1998 2000 2003 1998 2000 2003
GE(0) 0.297 0.263 0.242 0.26 0.229 0.213
within province 0.168 0.165 0.157 0.157 0.154 0.147
between province 0.129 0.098 0.085 0.103 0.075 0.066
GRDP PC GRDP non oil&gas PC
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GRDP data from BPS.  
The results in Table 2 imply that poorer provinces have generally grown faster than richer ones.  
But large investments tend to be localized so that, if there were no compensating movements of 
people, they would tend to increase within-province inequality.  The fact that there has been little 
change in within-province inequality suggests that changes in district GRDP within a province 
and changes in population have gone together.  Figure 5 confirms this.  Provinces that 
experienced increases in the share of their population in the top 20 percent of districts (by 
population) also tend to experience increases in the share of provincial GRDP coming from the 
top 20 percent of districts (by GRDP).  Thus, as the economy becomes more concentrated 
spatially, so does the population and vice versa, with the result that within-province distribution 
of per capita GRDP has remained relatively stable. 
                                                      
19 Using the Generalized Entropy class of decomposable inequality measures.  Similar results were obtained using other 
measures. 
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In order to explain what gives rise to these changes in the spatial pattern of inequality, it is 
necessary to understand the sub-national pattern of growth.  
4. INDONESIA’S SUB-NATIONAL PATTERN OF GROWTH 
Indonesia’s growth performance before the 1998 crisis was strong. The crisis dramatically 
reduced growth such that growth is only now recovering to near pre-crisis levels.   For two 
decades before the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, Indonesia’s economic growth averaged 
7 percent per annum. This was substantially higher than the average growth rate for all 
developing countries of 3.7 percent (Balisacan et al, 2003). At the end of 1997, the Asian crisis 
hit. Indonesia’s GDP per capita dropped 10 percent in 1998. After the crisis, following the fall of 
President Suharto’s New Order regime, growth resumed but at a much lower level (2 percent per 
annum between 2001 and 2005).  Only during the past few years have annual growth rates begun 
to approach those prior to the crisis (Figure 6). We therefore undertake our analysis for three 
separate periods: pre-crisis (1993-97); post-crisis pre-decentralization (1999-2001); and post-
decentralization (2001-05).  This helps to identify whether the determinants of growth are 
significantly different in these three periods. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on GRDP data from BPS. Real data (constant 2000 prices). 
 
Economic activities and resources are concentrated in Java (Box 1).  Java, Bali and Sumatra in 
general have relatively more advanced economic activities than other parts of the country, with 
manufacturing, trade and services dominating the economies on these three islands.  Sulawesi, 
Maluku and Nusa Tenggara, on the other hand, are much less industrialized, with agriculture 
making up the main sector of their economies.  Indonesia’s population is heavily concentrated on 
Java, and Java generally has relatively better infrastructure compared with the rest of the country.  
 
Box 1: Uneven distribution of resources and economic activity across Indonesia 
•  Java represents only six percent of the country’s land area but accommodates almost 60 percent of the population. 
•  Java dominates the Indonesian economy producing 52 percent of the GDP; Sumatra produces 28 percent of GDP 
and Kalimantan 11 percent. Eastern Indonesia (Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua) collectively account 
for only 10 percent of GDP. 
•  Eastern Indonesia is lagging behind in terms of the quantity of its infrastructure as measured by access to 
electricity and telephones. In Papua, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara, less than 10 percent of households have access 
to a telephone and less than 40 percent of households have access to electricity. 
•  Java dominates all sectors except for oil, gas and mining. Sumatra and Kalimantan contribute 18 percent and 22 
percent to this sector respectively. 
•  Manufacturing is the dominant sector in western Indonesia whilst agriculture is the dominant sector in eastern 
Indonesia.  
 
Appendix 2 presents some facts and figures on the distribution of resources and economic activities across Indonesia. 
The economic crisis marked a structural break in the growth performance of Indonesia’s districts 
(Table 3).  District-level growth before the economic crisis was fast, with the median district 
between 1993 and 1997 growing by 5.6 percent. In 1999-2001, the median growth rate across 
districts fell dramatically to 3.5 percent, and the variation of growth rates across districts was 
much greater, probably reflecting the differential impact of the crisis, as well as data issues in the 
  12immediate aftermath of crisis.  The post-decentralization period saw a further decline in the 
typical district growth rate, with the median district growth in 2001-05 falling to only 3 percent.  
 
Table 3 : Regional GDP per capita of Indonesia’s districts 
  (Median) Growth Rate in % 
  1993-97  1999-2001  2001-05 
Sumatra  5.8  5.5  3.5 
Kalimantan  5.7  6.2  2.7 
Java & Bali  5.7  1.3  3.1 
Sulawesi  5.3  5.5  3.0 
Maluku + Nusa Tenggara  5.2  3.7  2.8 
Papua  4.5  5.3  3.1 
       
Total  5.6  3.5  3.0 
       
Eastern Indonesia  5.2  4.8  2.9 
Western Indonesia  5.7  2.9  3.1 
       
Java  5.6  1.4  3.2 
Off Java  5.5  5.0  3.0   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on GRDP data from BPS.  
Note: Growth rates use real GDP in 1993 prices for 1993-97 and 1999-2001 and in 2000 prices for 2001-05.  
Districts outside Java bounced back faster than districts in western Indonesia after the crisis. Prior 
to the crisis, median growth rates of districts in Java and off-Java were about the same, at 5.5-5.6 
percent.  However, districts off-Java recovered from the crisis far faster than those in Java.   
Median growth between 1999 and 2001 was 5 percent off-Java, compared with a typical growth 
rate of only 1.4 percent on Java.  The same was true of eastern Indonesia,
20 which recovered from 
the crisis far faster than districts in western Indonesia. For example, the median growth rate in 
real GRDP per capita for Sulawesi was 5.5 percent.  This relatively high growth in eastern 
Indonesia was triggered by growth in the agricultural and mining sectors.  This is consistent with 
Alisjahbana and Yusuf (2004), who state that during the crisis the government tried to increase 
foreign investment by expanding oil, gas and mining exploitation.   
Other factors also appear to be associated with district level growth.  For example, cities (kota) 
have grown far faster than districts (kabupaten) since decentralization.  Table 4 shows the median 
growth rate of kota and kabupaten for the three time periods.  Cities bounced back far faster from 
the economic crisis (in part because they were much harder hit), but this faster growth rate has 
continued after decentralization, averaging 3.6 percent in cities compared with 3.0 percent in 
districts. 
 
                                                      
20 Papua, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara. 
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Table 4 : Cities grow faster than regencies 
 1993-97  1999-2001  2001-05 
Regencies (Kabupaten)  5.4% 2.5% 3.0% 
Cities (Kota) 6.2% 7.3% 3.6%   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GRDP data from BPS. Real data (constant 1993 prices). 
By contrast, being landlocked and having poor roads does not always mean slow growth.  
Contrary to the often cited disadvantages of landlocked countries, the growth rate of landlocked 
districts does not appear to be systematically lower than that of coastal districts.  More surprising 
still is that the (perceived) quality of roads is not related to growth rates.  Districts where villages 
report worse perceptions of road quality do not have slower growth rates than those that report 
higher quality roads, and having a higher share of villages with asphalt roads is only very weakly 
associated with higher growth. 
While there is a very strong relationship between being poor and being far from a large city, there 
is no obvious connection between remoteness and growth.  There are no districts with a GDP 
larger than Rp 2 trillion (around US$222 million) that are more than 1,000 km from one of 
Indonesia’s five large cities.  On average, the growth rates of these smaller and more remote 
districts are no lower than those of districts far closer to the main economic centers of the country 
(Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Does distance matter? 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on GRDP data from BPS. Real data (constant 1993 prices). 
Districts’ growth rates do, however, appear to be positively correlated with their neighbors’ 
growth rates. Figure 8 shows the correlation between districts’ growth rates with those of their 
neighbors. During the pre-crisis (1993-97) and post-crisis (1999-2001) periods there appears to be 
a positive association between the per capita growth of a district and that of its neighbors.  After 
decentralization, however, this relationship appears rather weaker, although a positive 
  14relationship is also apparent for the period as a whole. Landiyanto et al. (2005), in their study of 
East Java, also found that districts surrounded by wealthy neighbors tended to grow faster. 
Topography can also make a difference to growth.  Districts that have many villages on the coast 
or in the hills (as opposed to in valleys or on plains) tend to be poorer.  Between 2001 and 2005, 
they also tended to have lower growth rates, too.  However, this relationship does not appear to 
hold prior to the economic crisis. 
The possession of significant oil and gas resources does not necessarily boost district growth.  
Prior to the crisis, districts that relied heavily on oil and gas resources grew almost 2 percentage 
points more slowly than districts without oil and gas.  The same is also true for the immediate 
post-crisis period and for the decentralization era, although the gap in growth rates has narrowed.  
Interestingly, this is only the case for districts in which oil and gas is always the largest sector; the 
growth rates of districts that have some oil and gas in their GRDPs are generally similar to those 
of districts that do not have oil and gas.   
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  15There is a strong association between the level of GRDP and the sectoral composition of a 
district’s economy, but the sectoral distribution of GRDP is not closely linked to growth rates.    
The GRDP of districts with oil and gas is more than double that of those without these resources.  
The same is true for districts with a high (more than 10 percent) share of mining in their GRDP.  
Conversely, districts with a high share of agriculture in their GRDP (more than 20 percent) tend 
to have less than half the GRDP of those districts less dependent on agriculture.  However, 
neither prominent oil, gas and mining resources, nor a high level of agriculture are significantly 
and systematically associated with higher or lower district-level growth rates.   
There is no consistent tendency for districts with higher populations to grow faster.  Between 
1999 and 2001, an additional one million people raised the growth rate by 2 percentage points.  
This is consistent with standard growth theory: areas with higher amounts of labor per unit of 
capital will tend to grow faster towards an equilibrium steady-state growth rate.  However, this 
may be a consequence of the recovery of cities hard hit by the crisis.  There is no clear association 
between population and growth rates between 1993 and 1997, or between 2001 and 2005. 
Growth is also associated with better education.  Districts with higher net or gross enrollment 
ratios grow faster, with the association particularly strong for junior and senior secondary 
schools.  Some cultural variables also appear to have an influence on growth.  Interestingly, 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization is not directly associated with slower growth.  But regions with 
higher religious fragmentation appeared to have higher growth prior to the crisis, but this 
immediate association disappears after the crisis.   
The bilateral associations presented above make one important point clear: factors that are 
typically associated with higher GRDP per capita are not necessarily associated with higher 
growth.  However, such bilateral associations can also be misleading. What is needed is a 
multivariate model of the determinants of growth, to which we now turn. 
5.  METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATION 
The initial exploration of the data in the previous section suggests that surprisingly few factors 
are decisively associated with economic growth at the district level.  However, the analysis only 
looked at bivariate associations.  In order to explore the determinants of growth in a multivariate 
context, we draw on the large economic literature on the determinants of growth (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1991, 1994; Barro, 1991) to construct a simple growth model.  Specifically, we adopt 
three approaches to econometric estimation.   
 
First, neoclassical growth theory suggests that poorer countries and poorer regions should 
converge towards their long-run steady state growth.  We therefore examine the evidence in each 
of the three time periods (1993-1997, 1999-2001, and 2001-2005) of absolute income 
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convergence, both with and without dummies for the different island groups, by estimating the 
convergence model provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 2004): 
γ i, t, t+T = β0 + β(ln yit – ln yi*) + εi t         (1) 
where γ i, t, t+T is a per capita RGDP growth rate of region i between time t and t+T, yit is region i’s 
per capita RGDP at time t and yi* region i’s steady state value, β is the coefficient that represents 
convergence rate and εit the error term.   We extend this to incorporate possible spatial divergence 
by including the weighted growth of the neighboring districts as outlined above. 
Second, we explore relative convergence, adding a set of variables representing the initial 
conditions of each time period.  As noted above, these include measures of human and physical 
capital (population size, level of education, quality of pre-existing infrastructure); location and 
geography (whether on or off Java, the extent of urbanization, the topography of the region and 
its distance from major cities); economic structure (the share of different sectors, and the presence 
of terms-of-trade effects); and socio-cultural institutions (religious and ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation).   
Third, we take into account the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity determining growth by 
estimating a fixed-effects panel estimate of annual growth.  By definition, this approach excludes 
variables that are invariant over time. 
5.1 CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE? 
OLS estimates of absolute convergence 
Table 5 shows the OLS results testing for absolute convergence during the three time periods.  
There is little evidence for absolute convergence before the economic crisis.  However, 
neighborhood effects do appear to have an influence, with the weighted average growth of the 
neighbors of each district having a significant positive effect on the growth rate of that district.  
The same conclusion holds even when island dummies are added to take into account possible 
different growth trajectories in different parts of the Indonesian archipelago.   
In the immediate post-crisis period, there does appear to be strong absolute income convergence, 
but this probably simply reflects the fact that better-off areas of Indonesia were harder hit by the 
economic crisis.  The evidence for spatial divergence disappears, as does income convergence, 
when island dummies are included.   
During the decentralization era, the pattern of growth changes again.  There is now evidence for 
absolute income convergence, but the growth of neighboring areas is no longer significantly 
associated with district level growth.  The island dummies also indicate that growth in Sumatra 
was higher in the post-decentralization period, whilst at the same time growth in Nusa Tenggara 
and Maluku fell significantly behind that of the rest of the country (Java is the excluded island). Table 5: Absolute convergence of real per capita GRDP growth 
   Geometric average growth in real per capita GDP 
   1993-97 1999-2001  2001-05 1993-2005  1993-97 1999-2001  2001-05 1993-2005 
Ln per capita real GDP, 1993  0.006      -0.009  0.004      0.011 
  -0.004    (0.003)**  -0.005    (0.005)* 
Weighted average growth of 
neighboring districts 93-97  0.059     0.051     
  (0.023)*     (0.022)*     
Ln per capita real GDP, 1999    -0.025        -0.027     
   (0.012)*     -0.015    
Weighted average growth of 
neighboring districts 99-01   0.092     0.032    
   -0.047     -0.047    
Ln per capita real GDP, 2001      -0.006        -0.008   
    (0.003)*     (0.003)**   
Weighted average growth of 
neighboring  districts  01-05    -0.002     -0.008   
    -0.026     -0.027   
Weighted average growth of 
neighboring districts 93-05     0.021     0.017 
     (0.007)**     (0.008)* 
Dummy  Sumatra  Island      -0.008  0.051  0.005  0.007 
      -0.005  (0.017)**  (0.003)*  -0.005 
Dummy Kalimantan Island       -0.004  0.055  0.004  0.001 
      -0.006  (0.021)**  -0.007  -0.005 
Dummy  Sulawesi  Island      -0.012  0.037  0.000  0.005 
      (0.006)*  (0.014)**  -0.005  -0.003 
Dummy Nusa Tenggara & Maluku 
Island      -0.016  0.046  -0.010  0.011 
      -0.010  -0.039  (0.005)*  -0.009 
Dummy  Papua  Island     -0.003  0.033  0.006  -0.008 
      -0.012  -0.030  -0.010  -0.008 
Constant -0.043  0.390  0.117  0.156 0.001 0.403 0.154 -0.143 
 -0.058  (0.170)*  (0.039)**  (0.050)**  -0.066 -0.207 (0.044)**  -0.076 
Observations  244 268 277 243 244 268 277 243 
R-squared 0.05  0.04  0.03  0.09 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.12 
Note: all variables are for the base year of the regression shown unless otherwise indicated.  1993-97 and 1999-2001 growth rates are in constant 1993 prices; 2001-2005 and 1993-
2005 growth rates are in constant 2000 price. 
  185.2 DETERMINANTS OF INDONESIA’S SUB-NATIONAL GROWTH 
Period OLS regressions 
We now broaden the model to incorporate a wide range of potential determinants of district 
growth from each of the categories outlined above. Table 6 shows our preferred model for each 
time period. 
The results confirm the lack of income convergence, even in a relative sense, except during the 
immediate post-crisis period.  However, measurement error in the GRDP data could give rise to a 
reduction in the size and significance of this variable.  We also estimated the regression using 
mean per capita consumption expenditure as an instrument for per capita GRDP.  Doing this 
increases the size of the income convergence effect in the 2001-05 period and it approaches 
statistical significance.  We interpret this as weak evidence for conditional income convergence in 
the decentralization period.  However, there no evidence from this estimation of spatial 
convergence even in the first period. 
Surprisingly, having a population with a higher share of people who have completed junior 
secondary school appears to make very little difference to growth performance.  This is in marked 
contrast both to the bilateral association between growth and education found above and to 
typical country-level growth regressions, which tend to show a strong association.  We tested this 
finding using a variety of other measures for educational performance (e.g. primary schooling and 
senior secondary schooling) but the results were broadly similar. 
Similarly, having a larger labor force and a higher urban share of the population does not 
significantly affect the growth rate except in the most recent period.
 21  Between 2001 and 2005, 
districts with larger labor forces and those with more urban populations did have significantly 
higher growth rates, suggesting an urban concentration to the pattern of growth post-
decentralization.   
The inclusion of the sectoral profile of the local economy shows some sectoral biases to growth.  
Districts with a higher share of GRDP in manufacturing tended to have higher growth rates in the 
earlier two periods, although this effect has disappeared since 2001.  By contrast, districts that 
were heavily dependent on oil and gas had slower growth rates prior to the crisis.  Due to 
substantial multi-collinearity between sectoral shares (even after omitting one category), we do 
not estimate with all the sectoral shares.  However, to obtain an impression of the effect of the 
concentration of economy activity on growth we constructed a Gini coefficient of sectoral shares 
of employment for each district.  This shows a positive, but not statistically significant, 
relationship with growth.  Similarly, in order to explore whether changes in the agricultural 
                                                      
21 We use labor force in preference to population size to avoid potential correlation with GRDP per capita. 
  19terms-of-trade are responsible for growth, we include the Indonesian government’s Farmer Terms 
of Trade index.
22  Again, this has no statistically significant association with growth. 
 
Table 6: OLS regression of real per capita GDP growth on selected variables 
  -1 -2  -3 
   1993-97 1999-2001  2001-05 
Ln per capita real GRDP, initial year  -0.002  -0.073  -0.005 
 (0.48)  (4.91)**  (1.53) 
Weighted average growth of neighboring districts 
during the period 
0.037 0.048  0.011 
 (1.80)  (0.93)  (0.60) 
Share people ever/being in junior secondary school per 
total population 
0.045 0.028  0.012 
 (1.03)  (0.16)  (0.32) 
Share of population that is urban  0.019  0.019  0.031 
 (1.90)  (0.59)  (3.56)** 
Labor force, initial year  0.003  0.006  0.005 
 (1.49)  (0.85)  (2.74)** 
Share of non-oil and gas manufacturing to total GRDP, 
initial year 
0.034 0.105  -0.019 
 (2.85)**  (2.37)*  (1.77) 
Oil and gas is the main sector  -0.034  0.053  -0.011 
 (2.37)*  (1.43)  (1.28) 
Gini coefficient of sectoral employment  0.050  0.010  0.015 
 (1.73)  (0.12)  (0.70) 
Farmer's terms of trade index  0.032  -0.029  0.002 
 (1.25)  (1.39)  (0.49) 
Distance district to province's capital  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
 (0.76)  (1.83)  (1.04) 
Have to get on a boat to get to province's capital  -0.005  -0.018  -0.009 
 (0.87)  (0.86)  (1.75) 
Share of households with telephone connections  -0.051  0.248  -0.044 
 (0.59)  (2.09)*  (1.73) 
Ethno-linguistic Fragmentation Index  0.003  0.037  -0.003 
 (0.59)  (1.85)  (0.64) 
Java dummy  0.001  -0.047  -0.008 
 (0.21)  (2.86)**  (1.98)* 
Constant -0.039  1.001  0.026 
 (0.52)  (4.01)**  (0.47) 
Observations 128  167  219 
R-squared 0.25  0.29  0.14 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.     
Note: all variables are for the base year of the regression shown unless otherwise indicated.  1993-97 and 1999-2001 
growth rates are in constant 1993 prices; 2001-2005 growth is in constant 2000 prices. 
+ Data for 1999-2001 is from Podes 2000. 
 
                                                      
22 This is an index of output prices to input prices and consumption prices. 
  20To assess the impact of remoteness, we include the distance from the provincial capital,
23 as well 
as a dummy variable to indicate whether sea transport was necessary to make this journey.  The 
latter variable attempts to indicate the higher costs faced by more remote islands.  Interestingly, 
none of these variables are statistically significant (and the distance variable even has the opposite 
sign from the one expected in some periods).
24 
To measure whether pre-existing infrastructure has an important impact on growth we include a 
variable on the number of telephones per household in the district.
25  Although this variable was 
significantly associated with growth in the immediate post-crisis period, it is not statistically 
significant in any other period and has the opposite sign from the one expected. 
We also include a variable measuring the degree of ethno-linguistic fragmentation, which was 
found in other studies to be significantly (negatively) associated with growth.  Again, this 
variable is both economically and statistically insignificant. 
One variable that is highly significant and negatively associated with growth is the Java dummy.  
As shown above, growth was much slower in Java than outside Java during the immediate post-
crisis period after controlling for the other variables.  Interestingly, this appears to still be the case 
in the decentralization era although the economic significance of this effect is much reduced. 
Finally, it could be argued that, since we are estimating a long-run growth model, we should 
estimate the model for the entire period of 1993-2005.  Although we attempted this, there is 
clearly a large structural break in the model around the crisis period of 1998, with the influence of 
variables on growth being quite different before and after this break.  Indeed, the results of the 
pooled model are clearly driven by the rather unusual dynamics around the crisis period.  As a 
result, we do not present the results of the combined model in Table 6. 
The single most remarkable “finding” from these results is the lack of findings!  This is not for a 
lack of trying alternative specifications.  The results presented in Table 4 represent findings that 
were typical of the many alternative specifications tried, since our dataset has alternative 
measures for most of the dimensions of interest.  Nor does it represent multi-collinearity, since 
some care has been taken to ensure that the variables are not strongly collectively correlated.  
Some alternative model specification did provide more “significant” results, but in general these 
were driven by a handful of highly influential observations or variables.  The results that we 
present in Table 6 are robust in the sense that they are not highly sensitive to minor changes in the 
                                                      
23 Unfortunately this distance is the straight line distance.  Data on the actual road distances are not available. 
24 A number of alternative distance related variables were tried including the distance from the district capital to the 
nearest of the five largest cities in Indonesia (Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Makassar, and Batam) as well as the distance 
to Jakarta.  None of these variables were statistically significant. 
25 Again other infrastructure related variables were tried in different specifications of the model including perceptions 
regarding road quality and the share of villages in the district that have asphalt roads.  These variables were generally 
statistically insignificant. 
  21choice of sample or variables.  Moreover, they pass all the commonly applied tests for 
misspecification, including tests for omitted variables and heteroskedasticity. 
The general lack of statistically significant results probably reflects the extremely noisy nature of 
the GRDP data and the fact that, in the interests of avoiding problems with endogeneity, we have 
only used information about the initial conditions in each period as our explanatory variables.  
Since our panel contains a rich source of information about how both GRDP and explanatory 
variables change over time, we now turn to estimations that better exploit the panel nature of the 
data. 
Fixed-effect panel regressions 
One possible problem with the above model is the potential presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
in the dataset.  In other words, there may be factors specific to each district that determine the 
growth rate but that are not included within our dataset.  If these factors are fixed over time, this 
unobserved heterogeneity can be removed using fixed-effects panel estimation.  Thus, it is 
possible to obtain a less biased estimate of some of the parameters of key interest.   
The disadvantage of fixed-effect panel estimation, of course, is that by removing factors that are 
fixed over time it automatically excludes all the geographical determinants of growth.   
Furthermore, some variables have very little variation over time and so one must not rely too 
heavily on variables where the estimation results may be driven by spurious changes in 
explanatory variables.  We therefore arrive at the parsimonious model shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Fixed effects panel regression of annual per capita GRDP growth 
  -1 -2 -3 
    1993-97 2001-05 1993-2003 
Ln per capita real GRDP, initial year  -0.374  -0.403  -0.210 
  (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.015)*** 
Weighted average growth of neighboring districts during the period  0.375  0.001  0.368 
 (0.030)***  (0.025)  (0.023)*** 
Share people ever/being in junior secondary school per total population  -0.240  0.445  -0.100 
 (0.187)  (0.106)***  (0.113) 
Labor force, initial year  0.116  0.083  0.022 
  (0.032)*** (0.019)*** (0.009)** 
Gini coefficient of sectoral employment  0.028  -0.038  0.031 
  (0.096) (0.042) (0.052) 
Constant  3.876 5.163 2.708 
  (0.476)*** (0.441)*** (0.241)*** 
Observations  1130 1163 2048 
Number of groups   240  297  250 
R-squared  0.42 0.23 0.25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
Note: Growth rates for 1993-97 and 1993-2003 are based on constant 1993 prices; growth rate for 2001-05 is based on 
constant 2000 prices. 
  22The most striking characteristic of Table 7 is the strong income convergence.  In both the pre-
crisis and decentralization periods, poor districts grow faster than better off districts conditional 
on the other variables.  Prior to the crisis, this was coupled with substantial spatial divergence: 
fast growing districts had a strong positive effect on their neighbors.  However, this association 
appears to be absent in the period after 2001, consistent with the absolute convergence results in 
Table 5. 
Surprisingly, prior to the crisis, the educational level of the population does not seem to influence 
growth rates.  After decentralization this changes, with a strong and statistically significant effect 
of junior high school education on local level growth.  However, a larger labor force does appear 
to be statistically significantly associated with higher growth in both periods.  Finally, the sectoral 
concentration of labor does not appear to be statistically significant in either period.
26   
5.3 GROWTH ACCELERATIONS 
The large change in the average growth rate between 1993 and 1997 and the period since 2001 
masks a huge amount of variation in growth rates.  Figure 9 shows the very wide range of growth 
rates experienced by districts for both periods.  The central lines in each axis indicate the mean 
growth rate, whilst the lines on each side indication one standard deviation above and below the 
mean. 
What explains these changes in growth rate between the two periods?  If the growth model above 
is correct then changes in the growth rate between the two periods will only be explained by 
changes in the explanatory variables and not by their levels.  We therefore estimate a regression 
of the change in the growth rate between these two periods against the change in the other 
explanatory variables and their initial values, to explore the characteristics of districts whose 
growth accelerated (or decelerated).  The results are shown in Table 8. 
The main finding from Table 8 is the strong impact of initial income on the change in growth 
rates.  This suggests that districts that had a higher GRDP per capita before the crisis, tended to 
experience a somewhat smaller increase (or a larger decrease) in their growth rates between the 
two periods than districts that started with lower GRDP per capita.  The results also confirm 
strong income convergence.  Interestingly, the results also suggest that districts that saw a larger 
increase in their share of manufacturing GRDP, tended to experience a greater slowdown in their 
growth rates.  Similarly, districts that were further from the provincial capital tended to 
experience greater reductions in their growth rates. 
                                                      
26 Again, a large number of alternative specifications were tried and tested for robustness. These are available from the 
authors on request. 
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  24Table 8: Regression of change in growth rates between 1993-97 and 2001-05 
Dependent variable   
Change in average per capita real GRDP between 1993-97 and 
2001-05 
 
Ln per capita real GRDP, initial year  -0.012 
 (0.005)* 








Labor force (log), initial year  -0.001 
 (0.012) 
Share of manufacturing  -0.004 
 (0.023) 
Distance to provincial capital  -0.0000459 
 (0.0000198)* 
Change in per capita real GRDP  -0.058 
 (0.011)** 
Change in share of junior secondary schooling  0.114 
 (0.127) 
Change in (log) labor force  -0.061 
 (0.041) 








We draw four conclusions from our results: 
 
First, there does appear to be a general process of relative income convergence: poor districts are 
growing faster than better off districts after taking into account their other characteristics.  The 
difference regression also shows that poorer districts may have been relatively protected in the 
general decline of growth between 1993 and 1997, and between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Second, there also appears to be some evidence of spatial divergence, at least before the crisis.  
Thus, if a district is near to another district that is growing, it may be more likely that that district 
will grow faster too.  This makes intuitive sense given the production and expenditure linkages 
between adjacent areas, although it will result in an increasingly concentrated pattern of economic 
  25development in Indonesia.  Note, however, that there has been no evidence for this spatial 
divergence since 2001. 
 
Third, the effect of the sectoral composition of a district may matter but, perhaps because 
different factors appear to matter at different points in time, it is difficult to identify any 
systematic sectoral bias to growth.  To identify this better would require data on terms-of-trade 
changes (other than those in agriculture), but unfortunately these data are not available.   
Moreover, there is no systematic evidence that a more or less concentrated distribution of sectors 
gives rise to faster or slower growth, although there is some evidence that reliance on the oil and 
gas sector weakened district growth prior to the crisis. 
 
Fourth, having a larger labor force is positively associated with growth.  Also, having a better 
educated labor force appears to be strongly associated with growth, but only since 2001. 
 
Despite compiling a comprehensive dataset of potential factors associated with district level 
growth, the models above still struggle to explain most of the variation in growth rates that we 
observe across the country.  In part, this is likely to be because GRDP data at the district level are 
extremely noisy.  Further work will need to identify in more detail the variations in the manner in 
which the district GRDP data are compiled and to reconcile the inconsistencies with provincial 
and national level data.   
 
However, it may also be that idiosyncratic institutional factors play an important role in 
determining growth.  For example, having a politically strong and visionary district head/major 
may have a large impact, since they can pursue policies that stimulate investment and growth.  
These political and institutional policy factors have not been well measured in the past, but efforts 
are currently underway to collect more accurate data on these variables. Moreover, data are 
available on the political composition of local parliaments and the votes received by directly 
elected district heads/mayors.  Such data have not been used in this analysis because local 
parliaments were only elected in 2004, whilst direct elections for local leaders only occurred in 
2005 and 2006.  Thus, the potential exists for future analysis using these political data to obtain a 
clearer picture of the determinants of district growth. 
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Appendix 1 : List of variables 
gy (year T) (year t)  Geometric average growth rate of real GRDP per capita from year t 
and year T. The base year for the real GRDP data is 1993 
Ln_PCY(year t)  Log value of real GRDP per capita. 
GAW (year T) (year t)  Weighted average growth of neighboring districts from year t and 
year T. 
PRIM(year  t)  Share people ever/being in primary school per total population 
(Susenas) 
SECJ(year  t)  Share people ever/being in secondary junior high school per total 
population (Susenas) 
SECH(year  t)  Share people ever/being in secondary senior high school per total 
population (Susenas) 
sh_urban(year t)  Share of people who live in urban area (Susenas) 
shagr  Share of agriculture sector to total GRDP 
shmin  Share of mining sector to total GRDP 
shman  Share of manufacture sector to total GRDP 
shenr  Share of electricity, gas, water supply sector to total GRDP 
shcon  Share of construction sector to total GRDP 
shtrd  Share of trade, restaurant, hotel sector to total GRDP 
shtrs  Share of transportation and communication sector to total GRDP 
shfin  Share of financial sector to total GRDP 
shser  Share of service sector to total GRDP 
MIGAS2  Dummy variable for district that has oil & gas as main sector in all 
years 
jarak_prop  /  big  Distance to provincial capital / one of the five big cities (Jakarta, 
Surabaya, Medan, Batam and Makassar) 
dlaut_prop / big  Dummy if need to use boat to get to provincial capital / one of the five 
big cities (Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Batam and Makassar) 
TELPHH(year t)  Share of households with telephone connection in year t (Podes) 
SH_road_asphalt (year t)  Share of villages with asphalt road in year t (Podes) 
NTP (year t)  Farmer’s Terms of Trade year t (base year 1993) 
D_island  Dummy for big island group 
GOVEXP (year t)  Ratio of government expenditure to total GRDP 
ELF  Ethnic Linguistic Fragmentation 
RF   Religion Fragmentation 





  29Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
gy0593 256 0.02097 0.03672 -0.07932 0.31421
gy0501 336 0.02293 0.03567 -0.12381 0.20887
gy0199 283 0.07738 0.20676 -0.47664 1.44190
gy9793 256 0.05647 0.03137 -0.03361 0.18449
lnPCY_1993 266 14.15078 0.57476 13.08029 16.61269
lnPCY_1999 283 14.14987 0.59867 12.58044 16.78585
lnPCY_2001 336 14.33425 0.72321 13.02808 18.35805
GAW9305 314 0.25814 0.33591 -0.78676 2.32605
GAW0105 314 0.09693 0.12142 -0.52870 0.63099
GAW9397 314 0.18246 0.09336 -0.08555 0.47072
GAW9901 314 0.13758 0.21467 -0.43588 1.24946
PRIM93 280 0.49817 0.08607 0.23958 0.68224
PRIM99 260 0.46089 0.09214 0.20518 0.66932
PRIM01 322 0.45068 0.09378 0.19753 0.65017
SECJ93 280 0.12153 0.03987 0.02238 0.22781
SECJ99 260 0.14560 0.03444 0.02864 0.23713
SECJ01 322 0.14909 0.03549 0.03119 0.27372
SECH93 280 0.10913 0.06109 0.01850 0.30000
SECH99 260 0.14747 0.07026 0.02090 0.33486
SECH01 322 0.14421 0.07141 0.00560 0.34774
sh_urban93 280 0.30278 0.30117 0.00000 1.00000
sh_urban99 260 0.37053 0.30600 0.00000 1.00000
sh_urban01 322 0.37786 0.32119 0.00000 1.00000
shagr1993 303 0.32275 0.17931 0.00373 0.82762
shagr1999 328 0.34991 0.20512 0.00203 0.82550
shagr2001 336 0.32816 0.19088 0.00103 0.72787
shmin1993 291 0.04449 0.11745 0.00001 0.96308
shmin1999 314 0.06578 0.16313 0.00003 0.97836
shmin2001 336 0.06503 0.15940 0.00000 0.96543
shman1993 303 0.13820 0.14352 0.00023 0.90138
shman1999 328 0.14385 0.15345 0.00016 0.95099
shman2001 336 0.14796 0.15772 0.00022 0.96047
shenr1993 303 0.00816 0.00944 0.00007 0.06181
shenr1999 329 0.00836 0.00910 0.00016 0.07429
shenr2001 336 0.00825 0.00981 0.00013 0.10015
shcon1993 303 0.06725 0.03847 0.00520 0.27043
shcon1999 329 0.05144 0.03273 0.00113 0.22068
shcon2001 336 0.05205 0.03314 0.00112 0.17089
shtrd1993 303 0.16395 0.07336 0.00358 0.44753
shtrd1999 329 0.17147 0.08166 0.00258 0.44579
shtrd2001 336 0.17203 0.07915 0.00716 0.44215
shtrs1993 303 0.07262 0.05897 0.00327 0.37948
shtrs1999 329 0.06464 0.05757 0.00215 0.36203
shtrs2001 336 0.06254 0.05207 0.00195 0.30397
shfin1993 303 0.05535 0.03498 0.00094 0.21105
shfin1999 329 0.04093 0.03069 -0.01146 0.23960
shfin2001 336 0.04090 0.02785 0.00087 0.16653
shser1993 303 0.12900 0.06231 0.00339 0.32613
shser1999 329 0.10814 0.06219 0.00190 0.38893
shser2001 336 0.12309 0.06688 0.00240 0.39120
MIGAS2 336 0.05060 0.21950 0.0000 1.00000
jarak_prop 336 138 151 0.0000 1063
dlaut_prop 336 0.11310 0.31718 0.0000 1.00000
jarak_big 336 405 406 0.0000 2381
dlaut_big 336 0.55060 0.49818 0.0000 1.00000
TELPHH93 280 0.02328 0.03301 0.0004 0.21787
TELPHH96 288 0.03853 0.04706 0.00210 0.24122
SH_road_a~93 280 0.60891 0.25546 0.01873 1.00000
SH_road_a~96 288 0.62913 0.26106 0.02890 1.00000
NTP_99a 216 110.78980 21.27693 75.20000 179.30000
Dsumat 336 0.28571 0.45243 0.00000 1.00000
Djawa 336 0.33929 0.47417 0.00000 1.00000
Dkalim 336 0.11310 0.31718 0.00000 1.00000
Dsulw 336 0.13393 0.34108 0.00000 1.00000
Dnusa 336 0.08631 0.28124 0.00000 1.00000
Dpapua 336 0.04167 0.20012 0.00000 1.00000
GOVEXP99 328 0.04788 0.03938 0.00000 0.25114
GOVEXP01 335 0.11694 0.10230 0.00000 0.73284
ELF 330 0.45163 0.33042 0.00437 0.99757
RF 330 0.18430 0.20043 0.00134 0.77217
demind_99 258 0.32946 0.47093 0.00000 1.00000
demind_01 334 0.71257 0.45324 0.00000 1.00000  
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1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005
Sumatra 24.86 21.84 21.77 24.73 27.66 51.27 51.10 2.13 9.51 37.78 66.21
Java & Bali 6.80 59.12 58.91 54.35 51.81 62.27 71.19 1.60 11.30 47.19 71.98
Kalimantan 27.28 5.56 5.69 10.98 10.89 29.95 36.32 2.52 11.69 42.60 67.35
Sulawesi 10.52 7.42 7.48 5.31 5.00 53.76 54.48 1.99 10.22 38.55 62.62
Maluku + Nusa Tenggara 9.51 5.04 4.96 2.62 2.19 42.55 46.05 1.19 4.40 28.97 36.40
Papua 21.03 1.02 1.19 2.00 2.44 12.57 19.02 4.12 9.47 26.26 37.98
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 51.97 55.62 1.79 10.52 43.45 67.73
Eastern Indonesia 41.05 13.48 13.63 9.94 9.64 42.49 44.80 1.86 7.98 33.79 50.75
Western Indonesia 58.95 86.52 86.37 90.06 90.36 54.15 59.04 1.78 10.91 44.77 70.32
Java 6.50 57.53 57.28 52.07 50.34 61.38 70.43 1.54 11.20 46.57 71.91
Off Java 93.50 42.47 42.72 47.93 49.66 46.20 47.45 2.16 9.54 38.56 61.68




% of HH with 
electricity
Infrastructure
% of villages with 
asphalt road
% of HH with phone
Population (in %) GDP (in %)
 
Distribution of national GDP by main sector and by main island, 1993 and 2005 (%) 
Island 1993 2005 1993 2005 man_1993 man_2005 enr_1993 enr_2005 con_1993 con_2005 trd_1993 trd_2005 trs_1993 trs_2005 fin_1993 fin_2005 ser_1993 ser_2005
Sumatra 27.47 31.61 38.95 40.39 17.21 20.95 12.02 11.54 25.39 26.86 20.76 20.89 26.98 27.10 25.63 25.79 28.13 27.26
Java & Bali 49.49 44.53 18.70 14.04 73.28 71.83 79.57 79.31 53.38 46.84 65.74 64.18 52.70 51.67 55.71 55.51 51.89 50.75
Kalimantan 8.51 8.90 34.65 33.25 6.01 4.07 3.48 4.04 7.30 12.42 7.17 8.03 10.29 9.70 7.69 8.40 5.86 7.74
Sulawesi 9.19 9.49 0.69 2.43 2.68 2.45 3.67 3.96 7.85 8.83 4.02 4.32 6.57 7.23 8.16 7.43 8.96 8.56
Nusa Tenggara & Maluku 3.53 3.68 0.43 2.17 0.52 0.43 0.88 0.74 3.12 2.89 1.73 1.96 2.34 2.77 2.15 2.23 3.56 4.09
Papua 1.82 1.80 6.58 7.72 0.31 0.28 0.36 0.41 2.96 2.16 0.58 0.62 1.13 1.52 0.67 0.62 1.59 1.61
Indonesia 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Service  Construction Trade, Restaurant & Hotel
Transportation & 
Communication
Financial Service  Agriculture
Oil, Gas, Mining, Quarrying & 
Oil & Gas Manufacture 
Non Oil & Gas  Manufacture
Electricity, Gas & Water 
Supply
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Distribution of main island GDP by main sector, 1993 and 2005 (%) 
Island 1993 2005 1993 2005 man_1993 man_2005 enr_1993 enr_2005 con_1993 con_2005 trd_1993 trd_2005 trs_1993 trs_2005 fin_1993 fin_2005 ser_1993 ser_2005 1993 2005
Sumatra 24.18 22.64 21.77 22.48 13.66 17.92 0.40 0.50 5.73 4.42 14.39 14.09 5.37 5.94 4.70 3.81 9.80 8.21 100.00 100.00
Java & Bali 20.63 16.75 4.95 4.10 27.55 32.27 1.25 1.81 5.70 4.05 21.57 22.72 4.97 5.95 4.83 4.31 8.55 8.03 100.00 100.00
Kalimantan 17.07 15.29 44.16 44.38 10.88 8.36 0.26 0.42 3.76 4.90 11.33 12.99 4.67 5.10 3.21 2.98 4.65 5.59 100.00 100.00
Sulawesi 38.14 33.90 1.81 6.76 10.03 10.46 0.58 0.86 8.36 7.25 13.14 14.52 6.17 7.90 7.06 5.48 14.72 12.86 100.00 100.00
Nusa Tenggara & Maluku 39.88 32.10 3.07 14.70 5.31 4.44 0.38 0.39 9.02 5.80 15.42 16.13 5.97 7.41 5.05 4.02 15.89 15.01 100.00 100.00
Papua 21.32 17.11 48.98 57.12 3.24 3.14 0.16 0.24 8.91 4.74 5.36 5.56 3.01 4.44 1.63 1.22 7.39 6.44 100.00 100.00
Indonesia 22.48 19.47 14.27 15.13 20.28 23.26 0.85 1.18 5.76 4.48 17.70 18.33 5.09 5.96 4.68 4.02 8.89 8.19 100.00 100.00
Total  Agriculture
Oil, Gas, Mining, Quarrying & 
Oil & Gas Manufacture 
Non Oil & Gas  Manufacture
Electricity, Gas & Water 
Supply
 Construction Trade, Restaurant & Hotel
Transportation & 
Communication
Financial Service Service
 
 
 